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Recently, there has been increased interest in studying economic growth in the absence of secure
property rights and the presence of multiple organized and, hence, powerful groups in society;
see, e.g., Tornell [9], Tornell and Lane [5, 10], Tornell and Velasco [11], or Lindner and Stru-
lik [6]. When legal or political institutions are weak, powerful groups can inﬂuence the ﬁscal
process and thereby in eﬀect redistribute the economywide capital stock among themselves. The
development of the economy is therefore more appropriately described by a dynamic resource
allocation game than by a traditional neoclassical growth model with perfect competition. Pur-
suing this line of thought, the above mentioned papers study one-sector growth models with
ﬁnitely many agents (the power groups) who share access to the economy’s capital stock. Be-
cause the capital stock in these models is a common property asset, the familiar tragedy of the
commons becomes relevant: the powerful groups do not internalize the negative eﬀects which
their appropriation eﬀorts have on the production capacity of the entire economy and, hence,
economic growth is ineﬃciently low.
Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10] add another interesting feature to this
general setup: they assume that the players can extract resources from the public and insecure
capital stock and convert them into private and secure asset holdings. The private asset stocks
could be interpreted, for example, as bank accounts in foreign countries in which property
rights are secure. In the models studied in Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10],
the extraction from the common property asset stock is costless and the authors claim that
“including appropriation or adjustment costs would add nothing to the insights provided by the
model” [10, p. 26].1 We believe, however, that an explicit consideration of costs of appropriation
is important. A model that takes appropriation costs into account is not only more realistic
(after all, money laundering and lobbying involve the use of real resources) but, as our analysis
shows, it also yields new insights and modiﬁes a few key results from Tornell and Velasco [11] and
Tornell and Lane [10] in non-trivial ways. As for the new results, we can show for example that
both an increase in the appropriation cost and, when appropriation costs vary across agents, an
increase in the degree of heterogeneity of these costs reduce the growth rate of the public capital
stock. Thus, we have the striking result that high costs of money laundering are detrimental to
economic growth.
We also add another feature to the analysis, namely that the agents derive utility not only
from consumption but also from their wealth. Wealth is a vehicle for achieving social status,
and people do care about social status. Cole et al. [1] argue forcefully that status seeking is a
strong motive for economic agents, especially if goods are not allocated through well-functioning
markets.2 Including wealth as a ranking device in the utility functions of the power groups
1Their main results are as follows. First, the existence of powerful groups reduces the growth rate. Second,
an increase in the number of groups leads to better economic performance. And, third, an increase in the raw
rate of return to the common property asset reduces its growth rate (the voracity eﬀect).
2Cole et al. [1, p. 1092]) quote from The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith: “To what purpose is
all the toil and bustle of the world? ... It is our vanity that urges us on. ... It is not wealth that men desire,
but the consideration and good opinion that wait upon riches.” Cole et al. [1] also quote from Material Girl by
Madonna: “The boy with the cold hard cash is always Mister Right because we are living in the material world
2allows us to study how the elasticity of substitution between wealth and consumption aﬀects
the equilibrium outcome. In particular, we are able to derive a simple condition that ensures
that higher substitutability leads to a higher intensity of extraction from the common property
asset and therefore to a smaller growth rate of the public capital stock. The combination of
the wealth eﬀect and positive appropriation costs has also another interesting consequence.
Whereas in the model of Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10] the equilibrium
money returns on both types of assets must coincide, this is no longer true in our model with
wealth eﬀects and positive costs of transferring resources from the public to the private asset.
As a matter of fact, depending on the parameter values, the private asset can have either a
lower or a higher money rate of return than the public one.3
Considering the domestic capital stock as a common property asset makes the model formally
similar to one in which agents have common access to a natural (renewable or non-renewable)
resource. There is a large literature on these models and the paper that is closest to ours in this
respect is the one by Sorger [8]. Resource extraction models that allow for private storage of the
extracted resource have been studied, for example, by Sinn [7], Kremer and Morcom [4], Gaudet
et al. [3], or Dutta and Rowat [2]. Whereas Kremer and Morcom [4] and Gaudet et al. [3] study
competitive resource markets, Sinn [7] and Dutta and Rowat [2] deal with oligopolistic markets.
The paper by Dutta and Rowat [2] uses a setup that is very close to ours except that it does
not include wealth-dependent utility. Their focus, however, is quite diﬀerent from ours since
they are mostly interested in whether or not extinction can occur as an equilibrium outcome.
In our model, the marginal utility of wealth becomes inﬁnitely large as wealth approaches 0,
which implies that agents will never run down their wealth in ﬁnite time, i.e., extinction is not
possible in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we formulate the model and state all assumptions.
Section 3 characterizes the interior equilibrium under the assumption of homogeneous players.
We discuss how the structure of the equilibrium is aﬀected by the presence of appropriation
costs and wealth eﬀects. Furthermore, we study how changes in one or more model parameters
inﬂuence the intensity of appropriation and the net growth rate of the public capital stock.
Section 4 introduces heterogeneity of the power groups. We characterize again an interior Nash
equilibrium of the game and analyze how the growth rate of the economy depends on the degree
of heterogeneity. Finally, in section 5 we impose an additional constraint on the intensity of
extraction from the public capital stock. Such a constraint can be interpreted in terms of
capital controls. We show that, in general, there exists a pessimistic equilibrium in addition to
the interior equilibrium discussed in section 3. In the pessimistic equilibrium all players transfer
resources from the public capital stock into their private asset holdings as quickly as possible.
Finally, section 6 presents concluding remarks.
and I am a material girl.”
3Of course, if one deﬁnes appropriate concepts such as ‘full rates of return’, then, by deﬁnition, they must be
equalized in equilibrium.
32 Model formulation
Time is modelled as a continuous variable. Consider a common property asset with constant
rate of return R. We interpret this asset as the aggregate capital stock in an economy with
insecure property rights. There are n identical agents with access to this asset. Each agent
represents a group of individuals who – because they are organized and because property rights
are poorly deﬁned or not fully enforced – can inﬂuence the allocation of the capital stock among
the n groups. We do not explicitly model how the groups can redistribute capital: this can
happen, for example, through their inﬂuence on the ﬁscal process, through lobbying activities
or corruption, or through forcible misappropriation.4 Adopting the simpliﬁcations made in the
literature cited at the opening of the introduction, we assume that the agents can withdraw from
the public asset stock but that they cannot invest into it. The withdrawal rate (or extraction
rate) of agent i at time t from the common property asset will be denoted by xi(t), the asset
stock itself at time t is denoted by z(t), and the initial value at time 0 is denoted by z0. The




xi(t),z (0) = z0. (1)
Resources that the agents extract from the aggregate capital stock can be either consumed or
invested into private and secure assets. These private assets can be interpreted as safe bank
accounts in foreign countries, where property rights are fully enforced. The rate of return on
the private asset is constant and given by r. Denoting the rate of consumption of agent i at
time t by ci(t), it follows that investment into the private asset holdings of agent i at time t is
given by xi(t) − ci(t). Let us denote the private asset stock of agent i at time t by yi(t) and its
initial value at time 0 is yi0. It follows that
˙ yi(t)=ryi(t)+xi(t) − ci(t),y i(0) = yi0 (2)
for all i and all t. Consumption must be non-negative at all times. We also assume that
the agents cannot incur debt, that is, the private asset holdings must be non-negative. The
feasibility conditions can therefore be summarized by the requirement that for all t and all i the
inequalities




where γ is a non-negative parameter. We may interpret Ai(t) as the total wealth of agent i
at time t, where γ measures the weight given to public asset holdings relative to private asset
holdings. The weight γ can be smaller or larger than 1, depending on whether the agents attach
more or less importance to their private asset stock. For example, it may be that γ =1 /n ,
4Tornell and Lane [10] develop a detailed model of how powerful groups can redistribute capital through the
ﬁscal process.
4which would indicate that each agent thinks that only a fraction of the common asset really
belongs to him. Alternatively, the agents may give more weight to the public asset because the
private asset holdings are illegal and cannot be used to indicate high status. Anyway, in our
general formulation we allow γ to take any non-negative value. The agents derive utility both
from consumption and from wealth. We denote the instantaneous utility of agent i derived at
time t by U(ci(t),A i(t)). The presence of Ai(t) as an argument of the utility function displays
a wealth eﬀect that has so far been ignored in the literature on growth under insecure property
rights.
We assume that both investment into and withdrawal from the private asset holdings are costless.
Extraction from the common property asset, however, is assumed to be costly. This reﬂects
the fact that considerable resources have to be spent for lobbying or money laundering. The
marginal cost of appropriation from the common property asset measured in units of utility
is assumed to be constant and will be denoted by κ. Finally, we assume that the common




−ρt [U(ci(t),A i(t)) − κxi(t)] dt (5)
subject to constraints (1)-(4).
As for the parameters of the model we make the following assumption.
Assumption P: The number of players is an integer n ≥ 2. The parameters R, z0, r, yi0, γ,
κ, and ρ are real numbers satisfying z0 > 0, yi0 ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, ρ>0, and ρ>r .
The instantaneous utility function U is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 1. This implies
that U(c,A)=Au(q), where q = c/A is the ratio of consumption to wealth and where the
function u is deﬁned by the equation u(q)=U(q,1). The properties of U, which we shall
assume throughout the analysis, are summarized next.
Assumption U: The instantaneous utility function U :[ 0 ,+∞) × [0,∞)  → I R is concave and
homogeneous of degree 1 on its domain. The function u :[ 0 ,+∞)  → I R deﬁned by u(q)=U(q,1)
is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave on its domain and it satisﬁes u(0) = 0.
Furthermore, u is assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable on the interior of its domain and
to satisfy the Inada-type conditions limq→0 u (q)=+ ∞ and limq→+∞ u (q)=0 .
Assumptions P and U will be maintained throughout the rest of the paper without further
mentioning. It is well-known that ∂U(c,A)/∂c = u (c/A) holds for all (c,A) in the inte-
rior of the domain of U. In other words, the marginal utility of consumption depends only
on the consumption/wealth ratio q. Analogously, the marginal utility of wealth is given by
∂U(c,A)/∂A = w(c/A), where w(q)=u(q)−u (q)q is a strictly positive and strictly increasing
function of q = c/A > 0.
We are interested in symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of the diﬀerential game speciﬁed
above. These equilibria are deﬁned as follows. Let y(t)=( y1(t),y 2(t),...,y n(t)) ∈ [0,+∞)n
be the n-dimensional vector of private asset stocks. A (stationary) Markovian strategy φi for
player i is a pair of functions φx
i :[ 0 ,+∞)n+1  → I R and φc
i :[ 0 ,+∞)n+1  → I R. We call φx
i
agent i’s appropriation or extraction strategy and φc
i his consumption strategy. Applying the
strategy φi means that agent i chooses his appropriation and consumption rates according to
5the time-invariant feedback laws xi(t)=φx
i(y(t),z(t)) and ci(t)=φc
i(y(t),z(t)), respectively.
A strategy proﬁle is a n-tuple of Markovian strategies, one for each agent. A strategy proﬁle
(φ1,φ 2,...,φ n) is called symmetric, if φi = φj holds for all i and j. A strategy proﬁle is a
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium if, for all z0 ∈ (0,+∞), all y0 =( y10,y 20,...,y n0) ∈ [0,+∞)n,
and all i the following is true: the optimal control problem of maximizing (5) subject to (1)-(4),
xj(t)=φx
j(y(t),z(t)), and cj(t)=φc




In the above deﬁnition we have assumed that Markovian strategies can depend on the common
property asset stock and on all private asset stocks. In all equilibria discussed in the present
paper, the appropriation and consumption rates of agent i will only depend on the public capital
stock and on agent i’s own private asset holdings. Thus, nothing would be lost if one would
restrict the domain of admissible strategies in such a way. In particular, it is irrelevant for the





 (¯ q)=w(¯ q). (6)
From the assumptions mentioned in section 2 it follows that the left-hand side decreases strictly
from +∞ t o0a s¯ q goes from 0 to +∞. The right-hand side is a strictly positive and strictly
increasing function of ¯ q. Since both sides depend continuously on ¯ q, there must exist a unique
positive solution of equation (6). To understand the relevance of this solution, suppose that
the consumption/wealth ratio is constant and equal to q. The cost (loss of utility) of reducing
consumption at time t by an inﬁnitesimally small amount dc is u (q)dc. The gain from doing
so, on the other hand, is that the private asset holdings at time t increase by dc. This implies
that there are er(τ−t)dc additional units of the private asset available at time τ ≥ t. The
additional discounted utility that can be derived from these additional asset holdings is given
by w(q)dc/(ρ − r). Equation (6) therefore says that, at q =¯ q, the marginal cost of a reduction
of consumption equals its marginal gain. Note that equation (6) deﬁnes ¯ q as a function of ρ−r
but that ¯ q is independent of γ and κ.





which can be interpreted as a wealth-adjusted modiﬁed golden rule. Recall that the usual
modiﬁed golden rule says that the optimal steady-state holdings of a capital stock must be
such that the return (marginal productivity) is equal to the rate of time preference. In our
model, because wealth appears in the utility function, the rate of return to private capital is
r plus the marginal rate of substitution of private capital for consumption which, in turn, is
[∂U(c,A)/∂c]/[∂U(c,A)/∂y]=w(q)/u (q). Here, we have used the fact that ∂U(c,A)/∂y =
6∂U(c,A)/∂A which follows from A = y + γz. Note that the wealth-adjusted modiﬁed golden
rule is not about the steady-state holdings of capital as such, rather it is about the ‘holdings’
of capital/consumption ratio. It is in fact a no-arbitrage condition.
The no-arbitrage condition (7) involves only the private asset with return r. It is reasonable to
conjecture that an analogous no-arbitrage condition must hold for the common property asset.
Furthermore, because γ is the weight given to the common property asset and κ is the cost of
extracting it, it is intuitively clear that this second condition will depend on the parameters γ
and κ. To derive it, let us assume that all agents, except agent i, use the appropriation rate
xj(t)=βz(t), where β is a non-negative number. The private return on the common property
asset for agent i is then obviously given by ¯ R = R−(n−1)β. Since consumption of the resource
is not possible without prior extraction, the marginal utility of consumption from the common
property asset is given by [∂U(c,A)/∂c] − κ = u (q) − κ. Finally, the marginal utility of an
additional unit of the common property resource must be [∂U(c,A)/∂z]=γ[∂U(c,A)/∂A]=
γw(q). In analogy to equation (7), the no-arbitrage condition for the common property asset
should therefore read as
¯ R +
γw(¯ q)
u (¯ q) − κ
= ρ. (8)
The formal derivation of this condition follows exactly the same logic as that of equation (6) or
(7). Suppose that the consumption/wealth ratio is constant and equal to q. The cost of reducing
appropriation and consumption at time t by an inﬁnitesimally small amount dx is [u (q)−κ]dx.
The gain from doing so is that the common property asset holdings at time t increase by dx.
This implies that there are e
¯ R(τ−t)dx additional units of the public asset available at time τ ≥ t.
The additional discounted utility that can be derived from these additional asset holdings is
given by γw(q)dx/(ρ − ¯ R). Equation (8) therefore says that, at q =¯ q, the marginal cost of a
reduction of appropriation equals its marginal gain.
Let us denote the marginal utility of consumption at q =¯ q by ¯ κ, that is, ¯ κ = u (¯ q). Furthermore,





R − ρ +
(ρ − r)γ¯ κ
¯ κ − κ

. (9)
Using (6) and ¯ R = R−(n−1)β it is easy to see that β = ¯ β is the only value of β that satisﬁes
the second no-arbitrage condition (8). We are now ready to state the main result of the present
section.
Theorem 1 Let κ<¯ κ be given and assume that the condition
(ρ − r)γ¯ κ
¯ κ − κ
>ρ− R +( n − 1)γ¯ q (10)
is satisﬁed. The strategy proﬁle (φ1,φ 2,...,φ n) deﬁned by φc
i(y,z)=¯ q(yi+γz) and φx
i(y,z)=¯ βz
forms a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Before we present the proof of the theorem, it will be useful to derive the following auxiliary
result.
7Lemma 1 Let κ<¯ κ be given and assume that condition (10) is satisﬁed. Then it holds that
¯ β>γ ¯ q and R − n¯ β<ρ .
Proof: Using (9) it is easy to see that the (10) is equivalent to ¯ β>γ ¯ q. To prove the second
statement of the lemma, we distinguish two cases. If ρ<R , then it follows from the assumptions
κ<¯ κ and ρ>rthat (ρ − r)γ¯ κ/(¯ κ − κ) > 0 > (ρ − R)/n. On the other hand, if ρ ≥ R, then
we obtain from (10) that (ρ−r)γ¯ κ/(¯ κ−κ) >ρ−R+(n−1)γ¯ q ≥ ρ−R ≥ (ρ−R)/n. In both
cases it therefore follows that (ρ − r)γ¯ κ/(¯ κ − κ) > (ρ − R)/n. Using (9) again, it is easy to see
that the latter condition is equivalent to R − n¯ β<ρ . 
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose that all players j  = i use the equilibrium strategies φj.I n





−ρt[U(ci(t),y i(t)+γz(t)) − κxi(t)]dt
subject to ˙ z(t)= ¯ Rz(t) − xi(t)
˙ yi(t)=ryi(t)+xi(t) − ci(t)
˙ yj(t)=ryj(t)+¯ βz(t) − ¯ q[yj(t)+γz(t)] for j  = i
xi(t) ≥ 0,c i(t) ≥ 0, y(t) ≥ 0,z (t) ≥ 0,
where ¯ R = R − (n − 1)¯ β. The Hamiltonian function of this problem is
H = U(ci,y i + γz) − κxi + λ( ¯ Rz − xi)+µi(ryi + xi − ci)+

j =i
µj[ryj + ¯ βz − ¯ q(yj + γz)],
where λ and µk, k =1 ,2,...,n, are the costate variables corresponding to z and yk, respectively.
Note that the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in (z,y,c i,x i). The theorem is therefore proved
if there exist costate trajectories λ :[ 0 ,+∞)  → [0,+∞) and µk :[ 0 ,+∞)  → [0,+∞), k =
1,2,...,n, such that the feasibility conditions of problem P as well as the following optimality
conditions are satisﬁed by ci(t)=¯ q[yi(t)+γz(t)] and xi(t)=¯ βz(t):
Hci = u
 (ci(t)/[yi(t)+γz(t)]) − µi(t)=0 , (11)
Hxi = µi(t) − λ(t) − κ =0 , (12)




˙ µi(t)=ρµi(t) − Hyi =( ρ − r)µi(t) − w(ci(t)/[yi(t)+γz(t)]), (14)











We deﬁne the costate trajectories by λ(t)=¯ κ − κ, µi(t)=¯ κ, and µj(t) = 0 for all j  = i.
Note that all costate trajectories are constant and non-negative. Condition (11) holds because
of u (¯ q)=¯ κ and condition (12) follows immediately from the deﬁnitions of λ(t) and µi(t).
Substituting ci(t)/[yi(t)+γz(t)] = ¯ q and the deﬁnitions of the costate trajectories into (13) we
8obtain 0 = (ρ− ¯ R)(¯ κ−κ)−γw(¯ q). This equation holds because of the deﬁnition of ¯ R, equation
(9), ¯ κ = u (¯ q), and (6). Analogously, by substituting ci(t)/[yi(t)+γz(t)] = ¯ q and µi(t)=¯ κ
into (14), one obtains 0 = (ρ − r)¯ κ − w(¯ q). This equation holds because of ¯ κ = u (¯ q) and (6).
Condition (15) holds trivially because of µj(t) = 0 for all t.
To verify the transversality condition (16), let us deﬁne g = R − n¯ β. Lemma 1 implies that
g<ρ . From the state equation ˙ z(t)= ¯ Rz(t) − xi(t) and from xi(t)=¯ βz(t) it follows that
z(t)=z0egt. Consequently, we have limt→+∞ e−ρtλ(t)z(t)=( ¯ κ−κ)z0 limt→+∞ e(g−ρ)t = 0. From
xi(t)=¯ βz(t), z(t)=z0egt, and the state equation ˙ yi(t)=ryi(t)+xi(t) − ci(t) we obtain
˙ yi(t) ≤ ryi(t)+¯ βz0egt. It follows therefore that there exists a positive constant Y such that
yi(t) ≤ Ye max{r,g}t. This implies that limt→+∞ e−ρtµi(t)yi(t) ≤ ¯ κY limt→+∞ emax{r−ρ,g−ρ}t =0 ,
whereby the last equation follows from g<ρand r<ρ . Finally, limt→+∞ e−ρtµj(t)yj(t)=0
holds trivially for all j  = i because µj(t) = 0. The transversality condition (16) is therefore
satisﬁed.
It remains to be shown that the feasibility conditions are not violated. More speciﬁcally, we
have to show that the application of the strategy φi implies that z(t), yi(t), xi(t), and ci(t)
remain non-negative for all t (independently of the initial conditions z0 and yi0). We have
already proved that z(t)=z0egt which shows that, starting from any initial state z0 > 0, the
asset stock z(t) remains strictly positive for all t. Now note that lemma 1 implies that ¯ β>γ ¯ q
and therefore ¯ β>0. It follows that xi(t)=¯ βz(t) ≥ 0. Application of φi implies furthermore
that ci(t)=¯ q[yi(t)+γz(t)] and, hence, ˙ yi(t)=( ¯ β − γ¯ q)z(t)+( r − ¯ q)yi(t). This shows that
˙ yi(t)|yi(t)=0 =(¯ β − γ¯ q)z(t) > 0, whereby the inequality follows from z(t) > 0 and ¯ β>γ ¯ q (see
lemma 1). Therefore, yi(t) cannot become negative if it starts at a non-negative initial value.
Because ci(t)=¯ q[yi(t)+γz(t)], it follows also that ci(t) remains non-negative. This completes
the proof of the theorem. 
The equilibrium described in the above theorem corresponds to the interior equilibrium discussed
in the papers by Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10]. It is an equilibrium in
which players are indiﬀerent about how much to extract from the common property resource.
In the proof of theorem 1 this can be seen from the fact that the condition Hxi = 0 holds.
Theorem 1 has two crucial assumptions, namely, κ<¯ κ and condition (10). Note that the latter
is satisﬁed if R−ρ is suﬃciently large or if γ>0 and κ is suﬃciently close to (but smaller than)
¯ κ. Note furthermore that, for γ = 0, condition (10) reduces to the simple inequality R>ρ .
A further remark on theorem 1 concerns the relative size of R and r. In Tornell and Velasco [11]
and Tornell and Lane [10] it is assumed that R>rholds. If γ = 0, this is exactly what
condition (10) implies. In the present model, however, the assumption R>ris not necessary.
As a matter of fact, let us consider the case where R and r are chosen such that R<r<ρ
holds and where γ is positive. As has been mentioned before, condition (10) will be satisﬁed
in this situation provided that κ is suﬃciently close to ¯ κ. Thus, the interior Markov-perfect
Nash equilibrium described in theorem 1 exists also in situations where the total return on the
common property asset, R, is strictly smaller than the return on the private asset, r.
In Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10] it has been shown that, in the interior
equilibrium corresponding to the equilibrium from theorem 1, the private rate of return on the
9public asset has to coincide with the rate of return on the private asset. To see whether this
holds true in our model, let us compute the private rate of return on the common property asset
in the equilibrium from theorem 1. It is given by ¯ R = R − (n − 1)¯ β which, because of (9), is
equal to
¯ R = ρ −
(ρ − r)γ¯ κ
¯ κ − κ
(17)
Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10] consider a situation where none of the two
asset stocks is an argument of the utility function. This implies of course that both asset stocks
are treated equally which corresponds in our model to the case γ = 1. Furthermore, Tornell and
Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10] do not consider any appropriation costs which would be
reﬂected in our model by κ = 0. Substituting γ = 1 and κ = 0 into (17) it follows indeed that
¯ R = r. Thus, if we choose γ and κ such as to make our model as similar as possible to that of
Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10], we obtain exactly their result. In general,
however, ¯ R can be smaller or larger than r, as can be easily shown by inspection of (17). As a
matter of fact, ¯ R = r holds if and only if κ =( 1−γ)¯ κ, ¯ R>rholds if and only if κ<(1−γ)¯ κ,
and ¯ R<rholds if and only if κ>(1 − γ)¯ κ. These results involve the monetary returns r and
¯ R. One could deﬁne ‘full’ rates of return for the two types of assets by the left-hand sides of
equation (7) and (8), respectively. In that case, both rates of return would obviously be equal
to the time-preference ρ such that return equalization across assets would hold.
Let us now discuss the monotonicity properties of ¯ R and ¯ β with respect to the model parameters.
Lemma 2 The private rate of return on the public asset, ¯ R from equation (17), is decreasing
with respect to the appropriation cost κ, strictly decreasing with respect to the weight γ, and it
is independent of the number of players n.
Proof: The lemma follows immediately from (17), ρ>r , and γ ≥ 0. 
The monotonicity with respect to κ can be explained as follows. The interior equilibrium is an
equilibrium, in which agents extract the resource more quickly than they consume it. Positive
appropriation costs form an impediment to this voracious behavior, because these costs are
incurred before the resource is consumed and the agents have a strict time-preference. The
agents will only be voracious if the rate of return on the private asset is suﬃciently high relative
to the return of the public asset. Since the rate of return on the private asset is a ﬁxed constant
r, this implies that, for high appropriation costs, the rate of return on the common property
asset, ¯ R, must be very low. The fact that ¯ R is strictly decreasing with respect to γ is also easy
to interpret. A higher value of γ means that agents attach less weight to their private asset
holdings. Therefore, they have a weaker incentive to be voracious and, hence, the rate of return
on the private asset has to be high relative to the rate of return on the public asset in order for
voracious behavior to qualify as an equilibrium. This, in turn, means that the private rate of
return on the common property asset must be low if γ is high. The fact that ¯ R is independent
of n follows immediately from the no-arbitrage condition (8).
Lemma 3 The equilibrium extraction intensity, ¯ β from equation (9), is increasing with respect
to the appropriation cost κ, strictly increasing with respect to the weight γ, and strictly decreasing
10with respect to the number of players n. Furthermore, the aggregate extraction intensity n¯ β is
strictly decreasing with respect to n.
Proof: The ﬁrst part of this lemma follows immediately from lemma 2 and ¯ R = R−(n−1)¯ β.
The second part follows from the facts that ¯ R is independent of n (see lemma 2) and that ¯ β is
strictly decreasing with respect to n (this lemma), and from n¯ β = R − ¯ R + ¯ β. 
The results of this lemma are basically the same as in Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and
Lane [10]. Finally, we investigate monotonicity properties of the equilibrium growth rate of the
public asset. This growth rate is given by g = R − n¯ β. The following results hold.
Lemma 4 The equilibrium growth rate of the common property asset, g, is decreasing with
respect to the appropriation cost κ, strictly decreasing with respect to the weight γ and the raw
rate of return R, and strictly increasing with respect to the number of players n.






(ρ − r)γ¯ κ






From this expression it is easy to see that the ﬁrst three monotonicity properties stated in the
lemma hold true. The last one follows from g = R − n¯ β and lemma 3. 
Tornell and Lane [10] call the fact that g decreases with respect to R the voracity eﬀect, which
they deﬁne as “a more-than-proportional increase in discretionary redistribution in response to
an increase in the raw rate of return in the eﬃcient sector” ([10, p. 34]). In our model, the
discretionary redistribution corresponds to the term n¯ β. Our model allows also another inter-
esting observation that follows from the monotonicity of g with respect to κ. More speciﬁcally,
if one interprets κ as the cost of money laundering, then it follows that by reducing the cost of
money laundering, a government can increase the net growth rate of the public asset.
Given that both consumption and wealth are arguments of the utility function, it is natural to
ask whether the elasticity of substitution between consumption and wealth has any eﬀect on
the equilibrium growth rate or the intensity of extraction. In order to address this question we





where ε is a real number smaller than 1 and diﬀerent from 0. The elasticity of substitution is
then given by σ =1 /(1−ε). The corresponding functions u and w are given by u(q) = (1+qε)1/ε
and w(q)=( 1+qε)(1−ε)/ε, respectively. It has to be mentioned that the CES function does
not satisfy the Inada conditions in assumption U. Nor does it satisfy the condition u(0) = 0
when ε is positive. However, we have used these conditions only to ascertain the existence of
a solution to equation (6). Here, we shall show directly that (6) has a unique solution such
that the rest of our analysis remains valid. Indeed, it is straightforward to see that equation (6)
11yields ¯ q =( ρ−r)1/(1−ε) and, hence, ¯ κ = u (¯ q)=[1+(ρ−r)−ε/(1−ε)](1−ε)/ε. Combining this with
σ =1 /(1 − ε) shows that
¯ κ =[ 1+( ρ − r)
1−σ]
1/(σ−1). (18)





(n − 1)(¯ κ − κ)2 < 0 (19)





ln[1 + (ρ − r)1−σ]
(σ − 1)2 +
(ρ − r)1−σ ln(ρ − r)
(σ − 1)[1 + (ρ − r)1−σ]

.
The ﬁrst term in the square brackets is always positive but the sign of the second term depends
on whether σ is greater or smaller than 1 and on whether ρ − r is greater or smaller than 1.
If σ>1 (which is equivalent to ε>0) and ρ − r ≥ 1, then it follows that the second term in
brackets is non-negative such that d¯ κ/dσ<0. This, in turn, implies together with (19) that
d¯ β/dσ>0. We conclude that, under the stated assumptions, a higher elasticity of substitution
will lead to higher intensity of extraction.
4 Heterogeneous players
So far we have looked at the case of homogeneous players. The present section, on the other
hand, discusses the eﬀects of diﬀerences between players. To simplify the analysis, we restrict
ourselves to case of only two types of players. More speciﬁcally, let us assume that there are
n1 ≥ 1 players described by the parameters (ρ1,γ 1,κ 1,r 1) and the utility function U1 and n2 ≥ 1
players described by the parameters (ρ2,γ 2,κ 2,r 2) and the utility function U2. The total number
of players is n = n1 + n2. We assume that assumptions P and U hold for both types. For each
  ∈{ 1,2}, we will denote by u  and w  the marginal utility of consumption u (q)=U (q,1) and
the marginal utility of wealth w (q)=u (q) − u 
 (q)q.
In analogy to section 3, we deﬁne ¯ q  as the unique positive number satisfying
(ρ  − r )u
 
 (¯ q )=w (¯ q ), (20)
and we set ¯ κ  = u 
 (¯ q ). Furthermore, we deﬁne
A  =
(ρ  − r )γ ¯ κ 
¯ κ  − κ 
and B  = R − ρ  + A . Finally, we deﬁne
¯ β1 =[ B1 − (B1 − B2)n2]/(n − 1),
¯ β2 =[ B2 − (B2 − B1)n1]/(n − 1).
(21)
12The following parameter restriction will be crucial for the main result of this section.
n1A1 − (n1 − 1)A2 >n 1ρ1 − (n1 − 1)ρ2 +( n − 1)γ2¯ q2 − R,
n2A2 − (n2 − 1)A1 >n 2ρ2 − (n2 − 1)ρ1 +( n − 1)γ1¯ q1 − R.
(22)
Let us denote the type of player j ∈{ 1,2,...,n} by  (j). We are now ready to characterize the
interior equilibrium of the game with heterogeneous players.
Theorem 2 Assume that the parameter values satisfy κ  < ¯ κ ,   ∈{ 1,2,}, as well as condition
(22). The strategy proﬁle (φ1,φ 2,...,φ n) deﬁned by φc
i(y,z)=¯ q (i)(yi + γ (i)z) and φx
i(y,z)=
¯ β (i)z forms a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem is very similar to that of theorem 1, which is why we do not present
it here.5
Theorem 2 can be used to study the inﬂuence of heterogeneity on the equilibrium outcome.
As an illustration, we discuss the eﬀect of diﬀerences in appropriation costs on the equilibrium
growth rate of the public asset. Suppose that κ1 =ˆ κ + ε/n1 and κ2 =ˆ κ − ε/n2, where ˆ κ and
ε are real numbers such that n2(ˆ κ − ¯ κ2) <ε<n 1(¯ κ1 − ˆ κ). The latter condition ensures that
κ  < ¯ κ  holds for each   ∈{ 1,2,}, as required by theorem 2. An increase in |ε| corresponds to
a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of extraction costs across players. Deﬁning
W =

(ρ2 − r2)γ2¯ κ2
(ρ1 − r1)γ1¯ κ1
1/2
,
we have the following result
Lemma 5 Suppose that γ1 and γ2 are strictly positive. The equilibrium growth rate of the
common property asset, g = R − n1¯ β1 − n2¯ β2, is a strictly concave function of ε which attains
its unique maximum at
ε
∗ =
n1n2[(1 − W)ˆ κ + W¯ κ1 − ¯ κ2]
n1 + n2W
.
Proof: From the deﬁnitions of ¯ β1 and ¯ β2 we have




R + n1(A1 − ρ1)+n2(A2 − ρ2)
n − 1
.
It is therefore suﬃcient to prove that f(ε)=n1(A1 − ρ1)+n2(A2 − ρ2) is strictly convex with




(ρ1 − r1)γ1¯ κ1
(¯ κ1 − ˆ κ − ε/n1)2 −
(ρ2 − r2)γ2¯ κ2
(¯ κ2 − ˆ κ + ε/n2)2




2(ρ1 − r1)γ1¯ κ1
n1(¯ κ1 − ˆ κ − ε/n1)3 +
2(ρ2 − r2)γ2¯ κ2
n2(¯ κ2 − ˆ κ + ε/n2)3.
Obviously, we have f  (ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ (n2(ˆ κ − ¯ κ2),n 1(¯ κ1 − ˆ κ)) and f (ε) = 0 if and only if
ε = ε∗ This completes the proof of the lemma. 
As a special case, suppose that the cost parameters are the only source of heterogeneity. For-
mally, let us assume that the conditions γ1 = γ2, r1 = r2,¯ κ1 =¯ κ2, and ρ1 = ρ2 hold. In this
case, W = 1 and ε∗ = 0. We therefore conclude that, in a model in which the appropriation
cost is the only source of heterogeneity, a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of this
cost across players leads to a reduction of the equilibrium growth rate of the public asset. On
the other hand, if players diﬀer also in other characteristics, then it holds that ε∗  = 0 and that
there exists a non-zero degree of cost heterogeneity that maximizes the net growth rate of the
public asset.
5 The pessimistic equilibrium
In this section we assume that the players have to obey the additional constraint
xi(t) ≤ βHz(t) (23)
for all t and all i, where βH is a given positive constant. In other words, each player’s extraction
intensity must not exceed the exogenously given upper bound βH. Such a constraint may
interpreted, for example, as a certain form of capital control. If βH ≥ ¯ β and the conditions of
theorem 1 are satisﬁed, then the strategy proﬁle described in that theorem remains to qualify as
a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. However, there will also exists another equilibrium along
which all agents extract the common property asset at maximum speed. This is proved in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 Consider the diﬀerential game speciﬁed by (1)-(5) and (23). Let κ<¯ κ be given
and assume that the inequalities βH >γ¯ q and
(ρ − r)γ¯ κ
¯ κ − κ
≤ ρ − R +( n − 1)βH (24)
are satisﬁed. The strategy proﬁle (φ1,φ 2,...,φ n) deﬁned by φc
i(y,z)=¯ q(yi+γz) and φx
i(y,z)=
βHz forms a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Before we prove this theorem we state the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 6 Let κ<¯ κ be given and assume that (24) holds. Then it follows that βH > (R−ρ)/n.
14Proof: Because of (24), γ ≥ 0, ρ>r , κ<¯ κ, and βH > 0 it holds that
ρ − R + nβH ≥ βH +
(ρ − r)γ¯ κ
¯ κ − κ
> 0.
This proves the lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose that all players j  = i use the equilibrium strategies φj.I n





−ρt[U(ci(t),y i(t)+γz(t)) − κxi(t)]dt
subject to ˙ z(t)= ˜ Rz(t) − xi(t)
˙ yi(t)=ryi(t)+xi(t) − ci(t)
˙ yj(t)=ryj(t)+βHz(t) − ¯ q[yj(t)+γz(t)] for j  = i
0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ βHz(t),c i(t) ≥ 0, y(t) ≥ 0,z (t) ≥ 0,
where ˜ R = R − (n − 1)βH. The Lagrangian function of this problem is




where λ and µk, k =1 ,2,...,n, have the same interpretation as in the proof of theorem 1 and
where ν is the Lagrange multiplier for (23). Note that the Lagrangian is jointly concave in
(z,y,c i,x i). The theorem is therefore proved if there exist costate trajectories λ :[ 0 ,+∞)  →
[0,+∞) and µk :[ 0 ,+∞)  → [0,+∞), k =1 ,2,...,n, as well as a multiplier ν :[ 0 ,+∞)  →
[0,+∞) such that the feasibility conditions of problem Q as well as the following optimality
conditions are satisﬁed by ci(t)=¯ q[yi(t)+γz(t)] and xi(t)=βHz(t):
u
 (ci(t)/[yi(t)+γz(t)]) − µi(t)=0 , (25)
µi(t) − λ(t) − κ − ν(t)=0 , (26)
˙ λ(t)=( ρ − ˜ R)λ(t) − γw(ci(t)/[yi(t)+γz(t)]) − (βH − γ¯ q)

j =i
µj(t) − βHν(t), (27)
˙ µi(t)=( ρ − r)µi(t) − w(ci(t)/[yi(t)+γz(t)]), (28)
˙ µj(t)=( ρ − r +¯ q)µj(t) (29)











We deﬁne the costate trajectories by
λ(t)=
γ(ρ − r)¯ κ + βH(¯ κ − κ)
ρ − R + nβH
,
µi(t)=¯ κ,
µj(t) = 0 for j  = i.
15Because of βH > (R − ρ)/n (see lemma 6) and κ<¯ κ it follows that all costate trajectories are
constant and non-negative. The Lagrange multiplier ν is deﬁned by
ν(t)=
(¯ κ − κ)[ρ − R +( n − 1)βH] − γ(ρ − r)¯ κ
ρ − R + nβH
.
Because of lemma 6) and (24) we have ν(t) ≥ 0. Using these deﬁnitions and (6), it is straight-
forward to verify (25)-(29). Condition (30) holds because of xi(t)=βHz(t).
Deﬁning gH by gH = R − nβH, it follows from lemma 6) that gH <ρ . The transversality
condition (31) can now be veriﬁed in exactly the same way as in the proof of theorem 1.
Finally, we have to show that the application of the strategy φi implies that z(t), yi(t), xi(t),
and ci(t) remain non-negative for all t. Because βH >γ¯ q has been assumed, this property can
be veriﬁed in essentially the same way as in the proof of theorem 1. This completes the proof
of the theorem. 
If the assumptions of theorem 1 and βH ≥ ¯ β hold, then the condition βH >γ ¯ q required in
theorem 3 is satisﬁed. This follows trivially from lemma 1. Moreover, condition (24) is true
provided that βH is suﬃciently large. The assumptions of theorem 3 are therefore satisﬁed
whenever those of theorem 1 hold and when βH is suﬃciently large. It follows that in this case
the pessimistic equilibrium from theorem 3 and the interior equilibrium from theorem 1 coexist.
The equilibrium stated in theorem 3 does not exist if extraction intensities are not bounded
above, that is, if the constraint (23) is missing. If one would introduce a similar lower bound,
that is a constraint of the form xi(t) ≥ βLz(t), then it would be possible to derive also an
optimistic equilibrium, in which all players extract with intensity βL. The structure of the
equilibrium strategies in this case would be much more complicated because of the co-existence
of the constraints xi(t) ≥ βLz(t) and yi(t) ≥ 0. In particular, we believe that the strategies
of player i in any Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium would have to depend non-trivially on all
private asset stocks and not only on the own private asset holdings yi.6 We therefore leave the
characterization of the optimistic equilibrium for a separate paper.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that new insights can be gained by adding appropriation costs and
wealth eﬀects to the model developed by Tornell and Velasco [11] and Tornell and Lane [10].
A number of testable implications have been derived. For example, countries where powerful
groups have equal appropriation costs have higher growth rates than countries where powerful
groups have unequal costs. Furthermore, an increase in the cost of money laundering reduces
growth.
Our model can be extended in several directions. One may suppose that agents care about both
relative wealth and absolute wealth. This would make the status-seeking motive for the agents
6Tornell and Velasco [11] characterize optimistic equilibria in a model without non-negativity constraints on
private asset holdings.
16even stronger than in the present model. One could also model status-seeking by making the
utility function dependent on relative consumption. These extensions, as well as others, are
part of our future research agenda.
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18Appendix (available upon request)
This appendix contains the proof of theorem 2. We start with the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 7 Assume that the parameter values satisfy κ  < ¯ κ ,   ∈{ 1,2,}, as well as
condition (22). Then it holds that ¯ β  >γ  ¯ q  and R − n1¯ β1 − n2¯ β2 < min{ρ1,ρ 2}.
Proof: Using the deﬁnitions of ¯ β1 and ¯ β  it is straightforward to verify that the two
inequalities in (22) are equivalent to ¯ β1 >γ 1¯ q1 and ¯ β2 >γ 2¯ q2, respectively. Furthermore,
because of the ﬁrst inequality in (22), γ1 ≥ 0, and A1 ≥ 0w eh a v e
n2ρ2 − (n2 − 1)ρ1 − R<n 2A2 − (n2 − 1)A1 − (n − 1)γ1¯ q1
≤ n2A2 − (n2 − 1)A1
= n2A2 + n1A1 − (n − 1)A1
≤ n2A2 + n1A1.
Using the deﬁnitions of ¯ β1 and ¯ β  it is easy to verify that this condition is equivalent to
R − n1¯ β1 − n2¯ β2 <ρ 1. The inequality R − n1¯ β1 − n2¯ β2 <ρ 2 can be proved in analogous
way by starting from the second inequality in (22) instead of the ﬁrst one. This completes
the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Without loss of generality we may assume that player i is of type
1. If all players j  = i use their equilibrium strategies φj, then it follows that player i faces





−ρ1t[U1(ci(t),y i(t)+γ1z(t)) − κ1xi(t)]dt
subject to ˙ z(t)= ¯ Rz(t) − xi(t)
˙ yi(t)=r1yi(t)+xi(t) − ci(t)
˙ yj(t)=r (j)yj(t)+¯ β (j)z(t) − ¯ q (j)[yj(t)+γ (j)z(t)] for j  = i
xi(t) ≥ 0,c i(t) ≥ 0, y(t) ≥ 0,z (t) ≥ 0,
where ¯ R1 = R − (n1 − 1)¯ β1 − n2¯ β2. The Hamiltonian function of this problem is




µj[r (j)yj + ¯ β (j)z − ¯ q (j)(yj + γ (j)z)],
where λ and µk, k =1 ,2,...,n, are the costate variables corresponding to z and yk,
respectively. Note that the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in (z,y,c i,x i). The theorem
is therefore proved if there exist costate trajectories λ :[ 0 ,+∞)  → [0,+∞) and µk :
[0,+∞)  → [0,+∞), k =1 ,2,...,n, such that the feasibility conditions of problem P1 as




1(ci(t)/[yi(t)+γ1z(t)]) − µi(t)=0 , (32)
µi(t) − λ(t) − κ1 =0 , (33)
˙ λ(t)=( ρ1 − ¯ R1)λ(t) − γ1w1(ci(t)/[yi(t)+γ1z(t)]) −

j =i
µj(t)[¯ β (j) − γ (j)¯ q (j)], (34)
˙ µi(t)=( ρ1 − r1)µi(t) − w1(ci(t)/[yi(t)+γ1z(t)]), (35)











We deﬁne the costate trajectories by λ(t)=¯ κ1 − κ1, µi(t)=¯ κ1, and µj(t) = 0 for all
j  = i. Note that all costate trajectories are constant and non-negative. Condition (32)
holds because of u 
1(¯ q1)=¯ κ1 and condition (33) follows immediately from the deﬁnitions
of λ(t) and µi(t). Substituting ci(t)/[yi(t)+γ1z(t)] = ¯ q1 and the deﬁnitions of the costate
trajectories into (34) we obtain 0 = (ρ1 − ¯ R1)(¯ κ1 − κ1) − γ1w1(¯ q1). This equation holds
because of the deﬁnition of ¯ R1, equation (21), ¯ κ1 = u 
1(¯ q1), and (20). Analogously, by
substituting ci(t)/[yi(t)+γ1z(t)] = ¯ q1 and µi(t)=¯ κ1 into (35), one obtains 0 = (ρ1 −
r1)¯ κ1 − w1(¯ q1). This equation holds because ¯ κ1 = u 
1(¯ q1) and because of (20). Condition
(36) holds trivially because of µj(t) = 0 for all t.
To verify the transversality condition (37), let us deﬁne g = R − n1¯ β1 − n2¯ β2. Lemma 7
implies that g<ρ 1. From the state equation ˙ z(t)= ¯ R1z(t) − xi(t) and from xi(t)=¯ β1z(t)
it follows that z(t)=z0egt. Consequently, we have limt→+∞ e−ρ1tλ(t)z(t)=( ¯ κ1 −
κ1)z0 limt→+∞ e(g−ρ1)t = 0. From xi(t)=β1z(t), z(t)=z0egt, and the state equation
˙ yi(t)=r1yi(t)+xi(t) − ci(t) we obtain ˙ yi(t) ≤ r1yi(t)+¯ β1z0egt. It follows therefore
that there exists a positive constant Y such that yi(t) ≤ Ye max{r1,g}t. This implies that
limt→+∞ e−ρ1tµi(t)yi(t) ≤ ¯ κ1Y limt→+∞ emax{r1−ρ1,g−ρ1}t = 0, whereby the last equation fol-
lows from g<ρ 1 and r1 <ρ 1. Finally, limt→+∞ e−ρ1tµj(t)yj(t) = 0 holds trivially for all
j  = i because µj(t) = 0. The transversality condition (37) is therefore satisﬁed.
It remains to be shown that the feasibility conditions are not violated. More speciﬁcally, we
have to show that the application of the strategy φi implies that z(t), yi(t), xi(t), and ci(t)
remain non-negative for all t (independently of the initial conditions z0 and yi0). We have
already proved that z(t)=z0egt which shows that, starting from any initial state z0 > 0,
the asset stock z(t) remains strictly positive for all t. Now note that lemma 7 implies that
¯ β1 >γ 1¯ q1 and therefore ¯ β1 > 0. It follows that xi(t)=β1z(t) ≥ 0. Application of φi implies
furthermore that ci(t)=¯ q1[yi(t)+γ1z(t)] and, hence, ˙ yi(t)=[¯ β1 −γ1¯ q1]z(t)+[r1 − ¯ q1]yi(t).
This shows that ˙ yi(t)|yi(t)=0 =[ β1 − γ1¯ q1]z(t) > 0, whereby the inequality follows from
z(t) > 0 and ¯ β1 >γ 1¯ q1 (see lemma 7). Therefore, yi(t) cannot become negative if it starts
at a non-negative initial value. Because ci(t)=¯ q1[yi(t)+γ1z(t)], it follows also that ci(t)
remains non-negative. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
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